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PIERCING THE ACADEMIC VEIL: DISAFFECTING THE
COMMON LAW EXCEPTION TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LIABILITY AND THE FUTURE OF A BONA FIDE RESEARCH
USE EXEMPTION AFTER MADEY V. DUKE UNIVERSITY

LAWRENCE M. SUNG, J.D., Ph.D.*
CLAIRE M. MAISANO**

Pure academic research. These words conjure images of the noble pursuit of
truth and knowledge. Whether cast in the professorial robes of a scientist in a
university laboratory or in the bespectacled tinkering of a hobbyist inventor in a
home basement, this ideal persists today as a foil to applied research and
commercial development. Whether an illusion or anachronism, the presumption
that research at institutions of higher learning, or at non-profit and not-for-profit
centers, is entirely altruistic in nature is being challenged, at least in the patent law
context. One consequence of this scrutiny has been the revelation that even pure
academic research may not find safe harbor from patent infringement liability.
In general, any unauthorized conduct involving a patented product or process
can establish infringement liability. Of course, allegations of patent infringement
may be defeated by successful statutory and equitable defenses relating to the
invalidity and unenforceability of the patent. But prevailing on the defense of
noninfringement of a patent is a factual determination typically left to the
resolution of each specific case with no categorical exemptions as a matter of law.
A statutory exception to the general rule was established in 1984 with the
enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which provided a limited exemption to patent
infringement liability for activity reasonably related to the preparation and
submission of an application for federal regulatory approval.' No other statutory
exemption to patent infringement liability exists. However, a common law
exemption to patent infringement liability persists, at least in perception if not
reality, with regard to activity done for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
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strictly philosophical inquiry.2 Since its articulation almost two centuries ago,
some in the scientific community came to adopt this common law exemption as a
safe harbor for assertedly academic or otherwise noncommercial experimental
was deemed a "research use
work.3 In this manner, the common law exemption
4
liability.
infringement
patent
to
exemption"
Indeed, many scientists have been guided by a mistaken belief that the scope
of this research use exemption to patent infringement was so broadly applicable as
to insulate from liability virtually all experimentation performed at universities or
non-profit and not-for-profit institutions, among others.5 The correction of this
misperception was a focus of the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke University.6 Although the Federal Circuit has
not rescinded the common law exemption to patent infringement liability per se,
the court has clarified that the research conducted at many institutions of higher
learning or non-profit and not-for-profit centers for purportedly academic or
noncommercial purposes is not immune from patent infringement liability.
This article reviews the patent law jurisprudence pertinent to a research use
exemption.7 In particular, it addresses the statutory experimental use exemption

2. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) ("[I]t
could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine
merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine
to produce its described effects."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and ExperimentalUse, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1018-19 (1989) ("[T]he courts have
long recognized . . . that a purely 'experimental use' of a patented invention, with no commercial
purpose, should be exempt from infringement liability.").
3. See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges, et al. at 4, Duke Univ.
v. Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003),petitionfor cert.filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3475 (Jan. 2, 2003) (No.
02-1007), available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/patentbrief.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2003):
The experimental use exemption historically has protected noncommercial research from claims of
to
patent infringement; although prior to this case there had been virtually no litigation with respect
academic scientific research per se, the scientific community had every reason to believe that the
exemption would protect noncommercial academic research just as it protected other noncommercial
research.
4. See id
5. See Biotechnology Industry Organization, Backgrounder on PatentingGene-BasedInventions,
Genomics, 8 (Mar. 2000), at http://www.bio.org/genomics/genebased.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003):
A patent has no impact on an academic researcher not engaged in commercial activity. Scientists
engaged in academic research are totally free, without any fear of infringement actions, to conduct
research on any patented invention. These researchers are protected from a patent infringement action
by an 'experimental use' exemption because they are not competitors with a commercial motivation;
National Agricultural Biotechnology Council, Research Policy Issues, 10 (Fall 1995), available at
(last
http://www.nal.usda.gov/bic/Newsletters/NABC News/NABCfal195/9ResearchPolicy Issues
visited Mar. 8, 2003) ("[M]any researchers lack an understanding of patent law and operate under the
misconception that an overall research exemption exists.").
6. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
7. The literature is complemented by several excellent articles regarding the merits of an
experimental or research use exemption to patent infringement liability. See e.g., Eisenberg, supra note
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under 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) 8 and the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability that preceded Madey. In addition, this article provides a
comparative assessment of a research use exemption to similar provisions in
foreign laws. This article also considers the merits and feasibility of enacting a
bona fide research use exemption to patent infringement and the legislative
initiatives in that regard. Lastly, the alternative applicability of other laws
presently used to shield certain activities performed at universities or non-profit
and not-for-profit organizations from patent infringement liability is considered.

I
Patent law provides that "whoever without authority ...uses... any patented
invention, within the United States ...during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent." 9 Although the statute plainly addresses all uses, the courts
have refrained from construing the term universally. 10 Accordingly, to the extent
that not every unauthorized use of a patented invention constitutes infringement,
the relevant question is precisely what type of activity is exempt.
Before 1984, no statutory exemption existed with respect to patent
infringement liability. Such an exemption, if any, would have been of common
law construction. The Federal Circuit decision in Roche Products, Inc., v. Bolar
PharmaceuticalCo.," prompted Congress to enact 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as a
limited experimental use exemption to patent infringement liability for activity
reasonably related to the preparation and submission of an application for federal
regulatory approval.

2; Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. I (2001); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987);
David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 615
(1994); Gregory N. Pate, Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2002);
Steven J. Grossman, Experimental Use or FairUse as a Defense to PatentInfringement, 30 IDEA 243
(1990); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
10. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 856 (1984), superseded on othergrounds by 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(e) (1984):
Section 271 (a) prohibits, on its face, any and all uses of a patented invention ....Because
Congress has never defined use, its meaning has become a matter of judicial interpretation.
Although few cases discuss the question of whether a particular use constitutes an infringing
use of a patented invention, they nevertheless convincingly lead to the conclusion that the
word "use" in section 271 (a) has never been taken to its utmost possible scope ....
11. 733 F.2d 858.
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Statutory Experimental Use Exemption - 35 U.S.C. § 2 71 (e)(1)
At present, the only statutory exemption to patent infringement liability exists
with 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which provides:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product
(as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other
processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use,
or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.12
Section 271(e)(1) limits this exemption to activity reasonably related to the
preparation and submission of an application for federal regulatory approval. Such
activity may include experimentation and other data gathering so long as that
activity is reasonably related to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
application.
In this regard, § 271(e)(1) can be fairly characterized as an
experimental or research use defense, applicable only in the specific context of
regulatory compliance.1 3 Moreover, the effect of § 271(e)(1) should be measured
from the perspective of the overall statutory framework of which it is a part.
Although § 271 (e)(1) exempts from infringement such activity by the generic
drug manufacturer that would otherwise infringe § 271(a).
Section 271 (e)(2)
provides a cause of action for infringement based upon the filing of an application
to the FDA for market approval of a generic drug. 14 The statutory scheme thus
balances the interests of a patented, brand-name drug manufacturer in enforcing its
patent rights and the interests of the public in the availability of a competitively
priced generic version of the drug as soon as possible. Given the infringement
exemption under § 271(e)(1), § 271(e)(2) essentially authorizes a declaratory

12. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
13. See also Thomas F. Poch, The Clinical Trial Exemption from PatentInfringement: Judicial
Interpretation of Section 271(e)(1), 74 B.U. L. REV. 903, 913-14 (characterizing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
as a "clinical trial exemption").
14. Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J.,
concurring):
Section 271(e)(1) benefits competitors of the patent holder by freeing them from liability for
development work reasonably related to securing regulatory approval. By enabling testing to comply
with regulatory processes before patent expiration, this section allows competitors to enter the market
more quickly after the patent expires, thus limiting what would otherwise amount to an extension of the
patent term. Section 271(e)(2), on the other hand, balances the effects of 271(e)(1) to a degree by
making it an act of infringement for competitors to file an ANDA if the purpose of the submission is to
obtain approval and 'engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale' of the drug before the
expiration of the patent (citations omitted).
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judgment suit by a patentee against a prospective infringer.' 5 The otherwise stark
infringement exemption under § 271(e)(1) thus serves an important purpose in this
regard.
From a business perspective, the pharmaceutical industry arguably feels the
greatest impact of the intellectual property laws. However, its members view the
federal grants of exclusivity through patents, copyrights, and trademarks from very
different perspectives. This disparity is not surprising given that pharmaceutical
manufacturers include companies with competing interests on a large scale. 16 In
many respects, the distinction of intellectual property ownership separates the
haves from the have-nots.
The brand-name drug manufacturer typically undertakes years of research,
17
development and clinical trials at staggering costs to bring a drug to market.
With such investment at stake, intellectual property protection provides the relative
certainty of market exclusivity upon which a brand-name drug manufacturer
depends. Patent rights, for example, can create the opportunity, through an
essentially noncompetitive business climate, for a brand-name drug manufacturer
to recoup its investments in the patented drug following regulatory approval by the
FDA. The commercial success of a patented drug can also help offset the losses
incurred by a brand-name drug manufacturer on its drugs that never reached the
market due to failed FDA approval or otherwise.
In contrast, the generic drug manufacturer can often bring a generic version
of a patented drug to market more quickly and cheaply. Mindful of the brandname drug patent, a generic drug manufacturer can choose to develop a
noninfringing, albeit bioequivalent, substitute during the patented term, or wait
until the patent expires to produce copies of the brand-name drug. In either event,
the generic pharmaceutical manufacturer can take advantage of a streamlined FDA

15. Novartis Corp. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 271 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("When a
patentee seeks to block FDA approval of an NDA under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), the infringement
inquiry focuses on the hypothetical infringement that would occur if the defendant's NDA were
approved and the defendant began to make and sell the drug."); Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110
F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
16. See Lawrence M. Sung, 'Mylan' Presents Setbackfor Generic Drug Makers, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
21, 2002, at C8 (describing the aggressive competitive tactics and litigation strategies employed by
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. against Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the manufacturer of a generic version of
Bristol's patented BuSpar drug, which earned over $709 million in sales during the year 2000).
17. See Robert Pear, Research Costfor New Drugs Said to Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001 at CI
("A new round in the national debate over prescription drugs opened today with a study from
researchers at Tufts University estimating that the average cost of developing a new drug has more than
doubled since 1987, to $802 million."); Posting of James Love, love@cptech.org, to pharmpolicy@lists.essential.org, at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2000-May/000201.html
(May 25, 2000) (last visited May 19, 2003) ("[T]he costs of good clinical practice trials (the type used
for US FDA approval) were almost always in the range of $2,000 to $7,000 per patient.").
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approval process for its generic drug by filing an abbreviated new drug application
18
(ANDA) that greatly relies on the information known about the brand-name drug.
Still, generic drug manufacturers serve a vital public interest by making
generic drugs available to consumers at reduced prices compared to the brandname drug. 19 In turn, such competition typically motivates the brand-name drug
manufacturer to lower its price as well. 20 This public benefit was a focus of the
congressional intent behind the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984,21 better known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. This statutory
framework recognizes the importance of facilitating generic drug approval by the
FDA well in advance of the expiration of the brand-name drug patent so that the
first day after patent expiration can reflect a competitive market as much as
possible.22
The Hatch-Waxman Act thus exempts from patent infringement liability
certain activity reasonably related to the submission of an ANDA by a generic
while the brand-name drug patent is still in force. To the extent a generic
pharmaceutical manufacturer states in an ANDA "Paragraph III" certification that
it does not intend to market its generic drug until the brand-name drug patent
expires, the generic can enjoy a safe harbor for conduct that would otherwise
constitute infringement under patent law.23
In the alternative, a generic

18. See Poch, supra note 13, at 913 ("The Act allowed generic drug manufacturers to file
Abbreviated New Drug Applications ('ANDA's), which are much less expensive and time-consuming
than full NDAs.") (citations omitted); James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical
Innovation. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L.
REV. 433, 458 (1986) ("ANDAs must contain information showing: . . . that the generic is
bioequivalent to, and bioavailable to the same extent as, the pioneer; [and] a certification that approval
of the ANDA will not violate a patent held by the maker of the pioneer.") (internal footnote omitted).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650
(estimating a consumer cost savings of $920 million in the twelve years following enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act).
20. See Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The
Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91, 93 (2002)
("In focusing on the pharmaceutical industry, many legislators felt lower prices for pharmaceutical
drugs could be obtained by increasing competition between generic manufacturers and brand name
manufacturers.").
21. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)).
22. See Ned Milenkovich, Deleting the BolarAmendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act: Harmonizing
PharmaceuticalPatent Protection in a Global Village, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 764 (1999)
("[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act ... enables a generic drug maker to market on the first day of patent
expiration by having FDA requirements satisfied in a timely manner.").
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 3556)(2)(A)(vii)(III) (2000) (setting forth ANDA "Paragraph III" certification
provision); see also M. Howard Morse, Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes in the
Pharmaceuticaland Medical Device Industries: Antitrust Rules, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 359, 385
n. 147 (2002):
If the applicant makes a certification under Paragraph Ill (i.e., if a valid patent is in force and
would be infringed), the FDA may approve the ANDA effective on the date that the applicant certifies
that the patent will expire. The Hatch-Waxman Act... authorizes use of patented drugs to develop and
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pharmaceutical manufacturer can assert in an ANDA "Paragraph IV" certification
that it intends to commercialize the generic drug before expiration of the brandname drug patent.24 Such a statement must be accompanied by the allegation that
the brand-name drug patent is invalid, unenforceable, or would not be infringed by
the generic drug.25 In response to notice of a "Paragraph IV" certification by a
generic, the brand-name drug manufacturer may sue for patent infringement. 26 In
addition to seeking the adjudication of the brand-name drug manufacturer's patent
rights, the filing of the patent infringement suit suspends any FDA approval of the
generic drug for up to 30 months.27
The Hatch-Waxman Act thus seems to strike an equitable balance between
the need for reliable patent enforcement by brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the need for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to begin the
FDA approval process before the brand-name drug patent expires. Moreover, the
public interest appears well served by maintaining the incentives for brand-name
drug manufacturers to develop pioneering drugs, and by facilitating public access
to competitively priced drugs as soon as possible.
The Federal Circuit has addressed the operation of § 271(e) on numerous
occasions. 28 Although the patent infringement claim in an ANDA litigation
derives from a specific statutory authority, the infringement analysis under

submit information to the FDA to obtain premarketing approval, without infringing patents, to ensure
generic drugs are ready for market as soon as relevant patents expire (citations
omitted).
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000) (setting forth ANDA "Paragraph IV" certification
provision).
25. See id. (requiring the ANDA applicant to certify "that such patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted").
26. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) ("If the applicant made a certification described in subclause (IV) of
paragraph (2)(A)(vii), the approval shall be made effective immediately unless an action is brought for
infringement of a patent which is the subject of the certification before the expiration of forty-five days
from the date the notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) is received.").
27. See id. "if such an action is brought before the expiration of such days, the approval shall be
made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the
notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) or such shorter or longer period as the court may order
because either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action .... ") Id.
28. See e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp, No. 02-1073, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 594 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 16, 2003); Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v.
Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Res. Corp., 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 99-1044, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21395
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 1999); Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Abtox,
Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Bio-Tech.
Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce
Labs., Inc., 69 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1995); DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62
F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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§ 271 (e)(2) proceeds similarly to the otherwise routine inquiry under § 271 (a).29 In
any event, the unique circumstances of patent infringement under § 271(e) have
prompted the Federal Circuit to provide a fairly detailed primer on the statutory
framework. In Mylan Pharmaceuticals.,Inc. v. Thompson,30 the Federal Circuit
said at length:
[A] pharmaceutical company seeking to manufacture a new drug is
required to file a New Drug Application ("NDA") for consideration by
the FDA. Preparing an NDA is frequently a time-intensive and costly
process, because among other things, it must contain detailed clinical
studies of the drug's safety and efficacy. The NDA must also include a
list of patents which claim the drug:
The applicant shall file with the application the patent
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims
the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or
which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to
which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be
asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. ... Upon approval of

the application, the Secretary shall publish information
submitted under [this section].
If the FDA approves the NDA, it publishes a listing of the drug and
patents on the drug's approved aspects in Approved Drug Productswith
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, otherwise known as the "Orange
Book." Because an applicant may not receive original approval for all
aspects of the drug as described in the original NDA submission, once
the NDA is approved, the applicant must amend the patent submission
to list only the patents that meet the listing criteria for the approved drug
product.
Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, a pharmaceutical manufacturer seeking approval to market a
generic version of a previously approved drug may submit an
abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") to the FDA. An ANDA
offers an expedited approval process for generic drug manufacturers.
Instead of filing a full NDA with new safety and efficacy studies, in an
ANDA a generic manufacturer may rely in part on the pioneer
manufacturer's work by submitting data demonstrating the generic
product's bioequivalence with the previously approved drug. These
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments "emerged from

29. See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 262 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("The inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) is a standard infringement test. 'The only difference ...is
that the allegedly infringing drug has not yet been marketed and therefore the question of infringement
must focus on what the ANDA applicant will likely market if its application is approved."').
30. 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Congress' efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce
name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to
research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market."
Thus, Title I of the Act was intended to "make available more low cost
generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for
pioneer drugs first approved after 1962." Title II, on the other side of
the scale, was intended to benefit pioneer drug manufacturers by
"restor[ing] ... some of the time lost on patent life while the product is
awaiting pre-market approval."
The Hatch-Waxman provisions concerning patent infringement are part
of this balance. Under 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1), it is not infringement to
conduct otherwise infringing acts necessary to prepare an ANDA.
Under section 271(e)(2), however, a generic drug manufacturer
infringes by filing an ANDA to obtain FDA approval for the purpose of
marketing a generic drug product claimed in a patent before the patent
expires. Despite this provision, not all ANDA applicants can be sued
immediately for infringement; moreover, they cannot sue immediately
for declaratory judgment with respect to the patent, as further discussed
below.
As part of the ANDA process, an applicant seeking to market a generic
version of a listed drug must make a certification as to each patent listed
in the Orange Book which "claims the listed drug ... or which claims a
use for such listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval."
Further, according to regulations enacted by the FDA, an applicant
whose ANDA is pending when a pioneer drug manufacturer lists
additional patents in the Orange Book must make certifications as to the
new patents, unless the additional patents are submitted more than thirty
days after they were issued.
In either case, the applicant must certify either that: (I) no such patent
information has been submitted to the FDA; (II) the patent has expired;
(III) the patent is set to expire on a certain date; or (IV) such patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the
new generic drug for which the ANDA is submitted. These are
commonly referred to as Paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications.
Further, if one of the listed patents is a method-of-use patent which does
not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking approval, the
applicant must make a statement to that effect (a "Section viii
Statement").
An ANDA containing a Paragraph I or II certification may be approved
without additional delay. An ANDA containing a Paragraph III
certification indicates that the applicant does not intend to market the
drug until after the expiration of the patent, and the approval of the
ANDA cannot be made final until the patent expires.

2003]

PIERCING THE ACADEMIC VEIL

When an ANDA contains a Paragraph IV certification, the ANDA
applicant must give notice to the patentee and must provide detailed
bases for its belief that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed. The patentee is then given forty-five days to sue the ANDA
applicant for infringement. If the patentee does not file suit, the
application may be approved. If the patentee files suit within that
period, the FDA may not approve the ANDA until the expiration of the
patent, judicial resolution of the infringement suit, a judicial
determination that the patent is invalid or unenforceable, or thirty
months from the patentee's receipt of notice, whichever is earliest. The
court in which the suit is pending may order a shorter or longer stay on
the approval time if "either party to the action fail[s] to reasonably
cooperate in expediting the action."
Moreover, the availability of
declaratory judgment actions is limited: "Until the expiration of fortyfive days from the date the notice made under paragraph (2)(B)(i) is
received, no action may be brought under section 2201 of Title 28, for a
declaratory judgment with respect to the patent." These provisions give
the pioneer manufacturer the first opportunity to file suit against the
ANDA applicant for infringement, and may substantially delay the
ANDA approval during the pendency of the litigation.
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments, however, do not include any explicit
provisions either enabling or prohibiting an action to challenge a
patentee's listing of a patent in the Orange Book. By regulation, the
FDA has provided a limited process for disputing the accuracy or
relevance of patent information submitted to the FDA and listed in the
Orange Book.
One who questions the accuracy of the patent
information may write to the FDA, and the FDA will request that the
applicant confirm the information. According to the FDA's regulations,
however, "[u]nless the application holder withdraws or amends its
patent information in response to FDA's request, the agency will not
change the patent information in the list" and an ANDA applicant must
still make certifications for each patent despite its disagreement.3 '
Common Law Exemption to Patent Infringement Liability
In contrast, outside the narrow context prescribed under § 271(e)(1), no
statutory defense exists to excuse research generally from patent infringement
liability. To be sure, the 1952 Patent Act, which established virtually all of the
statutory authority in operation today, did not codify such an infringement defense.
Nor did the 1952 Patent Act disavow any common law precedent for an exemption
in this vein. The notion of a generally applicable common law exemption to patent
infringement liability thus arguably has some continuing vitality.

31. Id. at 1325-27 (internal citations omitted).
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The consideration that the patent laws could not have been intended to reach
all activity can be traced to judicial opinions dating back as far as the early
1800s. 32 However, the relatively rare number of reported cases in which an
accused infringer invoked a common law experimental use exemption suggests a
discord between the theoretical and practical applicability of this defense.33 In any
event, an examination of the common law origins of this concept reveals the
rationales for the exception.
The first articulation of a common law exemption to patent infringement
liability is often attributed to dictum in the opinion by Justice Story in Whittemore
v. Cutter.34 The case involved an infringement claim regarding a patent to a
machine for producing playing cards. Justice Story addressed the lower court's
distinction based upon the defendant's underlying motive for engaging in the
infringing activity. Justice Story noted:
[I]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects.35
At first blush, Justice Story appeared to support the exclusion of two types of
otherwise infringing conduct, the first relating to abstract study, and the second to a
more purposeful testing for reproducibility and verification. However, Justice
Story did not elaborate a standard for entitlement to immunity from patent
infringement liability under either rubric. Nor did Justice Story suggest whether
such standards would be applied objectively or subjectively, or as a matter of law
or equity.
In any event, Justice Story's continued conviction on this issue was evident in
his opinion in Sawin v. Guild.36 In this case, Justice Story revisited the notion of
excluding certain otherwise infringing activity from liability. Furthermore, Justice
Story expanded his reasoning regarding an exemption for otherwise infringing use
into the context of an allegedly infringing sale.
In Sawin, the court considered whether a sheriffs seizure and sale of three
patented brad nail cutting machines as execution upon a debt, as well as the

32. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas.
1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) and Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)
(No. 12,391)).
33. Cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 222 (1987) ("[H]ardly any cases have allowed the defense to excuse
otherwise infringing activities that were conducted 'merely for the purpose of philosophical
experiments."').
34. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
35. Id.at 1121.
36. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
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buyer's purchase, constituted patent infringement. 37 Indeed, the allegedly
infringing conduct did not involve any manufacture or use of the machines, but
rested upon their unauthorized sale. 38 Justice Story reaffirmed his statements from
Whittemore, remarking:
This court has already had occasion to consider the clause in question,
and upon mature deliberation, it has held that the making of a patented
machine to be an offence within the purview of it, must be the making
with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of
philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the
specification. In other words, that the making must be with an intent to
infringe the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of
his discovery.
In the present case, we think that a sale of a patented machine, within
the prohibitions of the same clause, must be a sale not of the materials
of a machine, either separate or combined, but of a complete machine,
with the right, express or implied, of using the same in the manner
secured by the patent. It must be a tortious sale, not for the purpose
merely of depriving the owner of the materials, but of the use and
benefit of his patent. There is no pretence, in the case before us, that the
officer had either sold or guaranteed a right to use the machine in the
manner pointed out in the patent-right. He sold the materials as such, to
be applied by the purchaser as he should by law have a right to apply
them. The purchaser must therefore act on his own
peril, but in no
39
respect can the officer be responsible for his conduct.
In so holding, Justice Story extended the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability to conduct beyond the use of a patent invention, such as a
sale or other commercial transaction. Furthermore, in distinguishing between
tortious and non-tortious acts, Justice Story appeared to draw from common law
principles of intentional tort. The touchstone of the common law exemption to
patent infringement liability thus seemed less about the actual nature of the
infringing activity than about the infringer's intent or underlying motivation. In
this sense, the contention that the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability survived the 1952 Patent Act appears to have suffered a fatal infirmity.

37. See id at 554. ("[T]he defendant is a deputy sheriff of the county of Norfolk, and having an
execution in his hands against the plaintiffs for the sum of $567.27 debt and costs, by virtue of his
office, seized and sold, on said execution, the materials of three of said patented machines, which were
at the time complete and fit for operation, and belonged to the plaintiffs.") Id.
38. See id. ("The purchaser, at the sheriffs sale, has not, at any time since, put either of the said
machines in operation; and the whole infringement of the patent consists in the seizure and sale by the
defendant as aforesaid.").
39. See id. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
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The patent law does not require any intent to infringe to establish
infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).4 ° Indeed, even the defendant's
knowledge of existing patent rights is not a prerequisite to finding a violation of
§ 271(a).4 1 Accidental or innocent infringement gives rise to liability no different
than willful infringement or infringement by reckless disregard. The defendant's
culpability thus has no place in a determination of liability under § 271(a),
although it remains a factor in the consideration of infringement under the doctrine
42
of equivalents as well as in the assessment of appropriate infringement remedies.
As such, patent infringement under § 271(a) can be construed as a strict liability
offense.43
Therefore, the common law exemption to patent infringement liability, at
least as originally articulated, would seem at odds with the codified patent law. To
the extent this conflict exists, the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability arguably was superseded by statute, if not earlier. Nevertheless, the courts
have not abandoned the common law exemption to patent infringement liability.
The dichotomy between the common law exemption and the strict liability
nature of patent infringement seemed apparent. However, the courts did not
address any tension between these principles. In Hogg v. Emerson,44 the U.S.
Supreme Court treated the issues in concert offhandedly. The patented invention
in Hogg was an improved steam engine. In considering the award of enhanced
damages for the patent infringement, the Court noted:
[A] fair ground existed for a mitigation below that amount, if the maker
of the machine appeared in truth to be ignorant of the existence of the
patent right, and did not intend any infringement. That would not,
however, furnish a reason, as was insisted by the plaintiffs in error, for
allowing no damages when making the machine to be used, and not, as
in some cases, merely for a model, or for fancy, or philosophical
illustration. The intent not to injure, also, never exonerates, as is

40. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
41. See Robert Ryan Morishita, Patent Infringement after GA TT: What is an Offer to Sell?, 1997
UTAH L. REv. 905, 926 ("Patent infringement is a strict liability offense; that is, no intent or knowledge
is required to infringe.").
42. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997) ("Application of
the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires
proof of intent.").
43. Notably, independent development of the patented technology is irrelevant to infringement
liability under § 271(a). By contrast, the independent development of a technology protected by trade
secret is a legitimate defense against a claim of trade secret misappropriation, just as the independent
creation of a copyrighted work is a valid defense against a claim of copyright infringement.
44. 52 U.S. 587 (1850).
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contended, in these cases, from all damages for the actual injury or
encroachment, though it may mitigate them.45
Despite concerns about the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability, the courts remained faithful to its consideration. In Byam v.
Bullard,46 Justice Curtis challenged the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability to the extent it rests upon the reasoning that certain
activitiesshould be exempt from liability because they create no harm.
Justice Curtis stated:
Nor can I find any solid foundation on which to rest the right of a
patentee to support an action on the case for the violation of his
exclusive right, except that settled and reasonable common-law basis of
all such actions, injury and damage; injury by a violation of the
incorporeal right, and damage, at least nominal, presumed by the law to
arise from such violation. Such I understand to have been the principle
proceeded upon by Mr. Justice Story, in Whittemore v. Cutter, where he
held that making a machine for a philosophical experiment, or to test the
sufficiency of the specification, would not be an infringement; and in
Sawin v. Guild,where he says the act must be with intent to deprive the
patentees of some lawful profit; and also by Mr. Justice Patteson, in
Jones v. Pearce, where he excepts the making of a patented article for
mere amusement, and not for profit. In these cases, inasmuch as there
was supposed to be no damage, there was thought to be no action. And
though I am rather disposed, with Mr. Justice Washington, in Watson v.
Bladen, to doubt whether the assumption is correct, that in such cases
there is no damage; yet if the assumption be correct, I think the
inference is sound that no action lies.47
In so holding, Justice Curtis appeared to depart from the intent of the
infringer as the touchstone of the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability in favor of the de minimis nature of the harm to the
patentee caused by the infringement. This shift in rationale, however, did not
lessen the tension between the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability and other patent law tenets. Rather, under Justice Curtis' reasoning,
the common law exemption to patent infringement liability would still run
afoul of the patent law principle that a patentee would be entitled to at least a
reasonable royalty for the infringement even if a patentee cannot prove actual
economic harm.48 In other words, the de minimis nature of the harm to the

45. Id. at 607-08 (citations omitted).
46. 4 F. Cas. 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 2,262).
47. Id.
at 935 (citations omitted).
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1998) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.");
see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Section 284 imposes no
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patentee caused by the infringement should not vitiate the liability for such
infringement, even though the available remedy might be nominal.
In Poppenhusen v. Falke,49 Justice Curtis' conception of the common law
exemption to patent infringement liability achieved its modem day
articulation in the specific context of alleged experimentation.
In
Poppenhusen, the court held that the defendants infringed two patents for
improved modes of treating caoutchouc and other vulcanizable gums. With
respect to one of the patents, Judge Shipman wrote:
It is said, indeed, that the acts of the respondents are not in violation of
either patent, because they are mere experiments. I do not think the
facts disclosed warrant the conclusion that these were within that class
of experiments protected by law. It has been held, and no doubt is now
well settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole
purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere
amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee. I do not
think, however, that the acts of the respondents come under that head.
They are rivals of the complainant in the very business to which his
patents relate. They, or most of them, are perfectly familiar with his
patents and processes, having formerly been in his employ in
manufacturing articles under his patents. The answer alleges that all the
defendants have thus far done since the organization of said company,
has been done by way of experiment, for the purpose of hereafter
working under certain patents, grants, and licenses of their own; of
course, these patents, under which they claim to work, are wholly
different from those of the complainant; and it can hardly be necessary
for the respondents to experiment with the complainant's inventions in
order to perfect their own,
especially when they are already perfectly
50
familiar with the former.
The consideration of the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability in Poppenhusen retrenched the focus on the exclusion of two types of
otherwise infringing conduct set forth in Whittemore, namely, activity relating to
abstract study and activity involving testing for reproducibility and verification.
The rejection in Poppenhusen of the defendant's reliance upon the common law
exemption to patent infringement liability, however, suggested the court's
discomfort with a broad application of the exemption, whether based upon the
intent standard of Whittemore or the de minimis standard of Byam.
Following these early considerations, the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability did not experience a noticeable resurgence until a half
century later in the Court of Claims. Unfortunately, its revival was not

limitation on the types of harm resulting from infringement that the statute will redress. The section's
broad language awards damages for any injury as long as it resulted from the infringement.").
49. 19 F. Cas. 1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
50. Id. at 1049.
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accompanied by a resolution of the inherent tensions with the patent law. In any
event, the forum in which the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability was reborn has great significance. As a predecessor to the Federal Circuit,
the Court of Claims provided precedent adopted by the Federal Circuit as
controlling authority. 5' This chain of events more easily facilitated the continued
vitality of the common law exemption to patent infringement liability in patent law
jurisprudence.
In Ordnance Engineering Corp. v. United States,52 the court applied defacto
the common law exemption from patent infringement liability in the context of
assessing reasonable compensation for the federal government's use of a patented
invention.53 The Court of Claims awarded Ordnance damages for the unauthorized
use by the U.S. Navy of its patented illuminating munitions, or star shells. In
assessing the proper amount of damages, the court divided the shells into three

51. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)) (establishing the Federal Circuit). The Federal Circuit is an
Article III court at the same level as the existing United States courts of appeals. S. REP. No. 97-275, at
2-3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12. The Federal Circuit represents the merger of the
United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25, 25 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)). The Federal Circuit adopted the decisions of the Court of Claims
and CCPA as precedent. See South Corp. v. U.S., 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) en banc
(recognizing holdings of predecessors, Court of Claims and CCPA). The legislative history on the
Federal Courts Improvement Act explains the Federal Circuit's purpose as follows:
The United States Congress created the Federal Circuit to fill a void in the judicial system by creating
an appellate forum capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law where
Congress determines there is a special need for nationwide uniformity [and] to improve the
administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent cases. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2 (1981),
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12.
52. 84 Ct. Cl. 1 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 708 (1937).
53. In contrast to patent infringement lawsuits before the U.S. district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338, a lawsuit before the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is more correctly
characterized as an action in eminent domain, rather than for patent infringement. See Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. U.S., 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) vacatedon othergrounds, 520 U.S. 1183 (1997) ("The
government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking of property under
the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power of eminent domain and the patent
holder's remedy for such use is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)."); see also Pitcairn v. U.S., 547 F.2d
1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Leesona Corp. v. U.S., 599 F.2d 958, 966-67 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (discussing the
various ways patent infringement by the government was characterized prior to the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 1498); Decca Ltd. v. U.S., 640 F.2d 1156, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1980). The policy rationale underlying
this waiver of sovereign immunity is the protection of contractors against patent infringement liability
for their manufacture or supply of goods and services to the U.S. government. In view of this, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 limits a patent owner to recourse only from the U.S. government and restricts the patent
infringement remedy to the recovery of reasonable and entire compensation for the unauthorized
conduct. Accordingly, in this context, the U.S. government is not in the position of an ordinary
infringer, but rather a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee. See Crozier v. Fried Krupp
Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 308 (1912) (characterizing the otherwise infringing conduct as "the
acquiring by the Government under the right of eminent domain ... of a license to use the patented
inventions in question .... ").
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categories: regular or service shell, ballistic shell, and experimental shell.5 4 The
court deducted the costs of the shells deemed as ballistic or experimental from the
final damages amount.55 The Court of Claims did not discuss the common law
exemption to patent infringement liability, nor did it give any reasons for excluding
the costs attributable to ballistic or experimental shell. However the court's
definition and exclusion of these categories suggests the application of the
exemption: Ballistic shell are not intended for battle or practice use, but are
samples fired for test purposes from each lot manufactured before the lot is issued
56
or sent to store. Experimental shells are shell built for experimental purposes.
In so holding, the Court of Claims discounted from the damages award
roughly 3.7% of the total number of infringing shells, which was arguably not de
minimis.57 Accordingly, the intent behind the otherwise infringing acts seemed
controlling in this case, rather than the impact of the infringement.
The Court of Claims again addressed the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability in dictum in Chesterfield v. United States.55 Chesterfield
59
sued the federal government for the unauthorized use of its patented technology.
The Court of Claims held that the Chesterfield patents were invalid as obvious in
view of the prior art.6 °
The court, however, noted further that even if the patents were valid, the
defendants did not engage in infringing activity:
The 422-19 alloy comes within the broad ranges recited in the two
patent claims in suit, and actual use by the defendant would constitute
infringement of said claims if the claims are valid. However, the
evidence shows that a portion of the 422-19 alloy procured by the
defendant was used only for testing and for experimental purposes, and
there is no evidence that the remainder was used other than
experimentally.
Experimental use does not infringe. In a patent
infringement case, District Judge Rifkind said:
'The

accused devices *

consideration

for

it

* *

can be eliminated from

affirmatively

appeared,

without

54. Ordnance Eng'g Corp., 84 Ct. Cl. at 2.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 2.
57. See id at 4 ("Deducting from this latter figure 7,425 ballistic and experimental shell leaves a
net total of 192,427 infringing regular service shell made or used during the accounting period . .
58. 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
59. Chesterfield, 159 F. Supp. at 372 (reporting the patents-in-suit as U.S. Patents No. 1,698,934
and No. 1,698,935, both of which related to metal alloys containing cobalt and nickel with other metals
and nonmetals, designed for use in the production of high-speed cutting tools).
60. Id. at 374 ("The two claims in suit are so broad as to cover alloy compositions which fall
within the ranges taught by the prior art patent. [lI]t is clear that many alloys within the ranges claimed
by Chesterfield would have been obvious, at the time the Chesterfield applications were filed, to a
person having ordinary skill in the metal alloy art.").

2003]

PIERCING THE ACADEMIC VEIL

contradiction by the plaintiff, that defendant built that device
only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it
for sale nor sold any.'
This principle was applied earlier by District Judge Seymour,
who said:
'It is true that, if an infringing machine is made or used as an
experiment merely, it does not infringe former patents.'
The claims in suit, if valid, are not infringed by defendant's
experimental use of the accused 422-19 alloy. The 6059 alloy
was likewise a cobalt-nickel alloy with chromium, molybdenum,
carbon, and other metals and non-metals. . . . Plaintiff's
metallurgical expert testified that 6059 alloy was used
experimentally. As point[ed] out above, experimental use is not
an infringing use. It is noted that plaintiff has stated that 6059
alloy does61 not make full use of the plaintiff's patented
invention.
The Court of Claims thus acknowledged the common law exemption to
patent infringement liability in the specific context of experimental use. The court
appeared to focus on the absence of any sale of the patented inventions. In so
stating, the court seemingly approved of the unauthorized manufacture or use of a
patented invention as an experimental use so long as such activities did not result
in a sale. The dictum in Chesterfield, however, was to become the high water
mark for the common law exemption to patent infringement liability in the post1952 Patent Act era.
The reversal of fortune for the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability came to the fore in Pitcairn v. United States.62 The Court of Claims
rejected the federal governrment's reliance upon the common law exemption to
patent infringement liability. In particular, the federal government sought to
exclude from infringement its testing, evaluation, demonstration and
experimentation of certain helicopters for lifting ability, for the effect of vibration
on installed equipment, flight speed and range, engine efficiency, and numerous
other factors.63 The Court of Claims emphasized that:
Tests, demonstrations, and experiments of such nature are intended uses
of the infringing aircraft manufactured for the defendant and are in
keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency. Experimental
use is not a defense in the present litigation. 64
In so holding, the Court of Claims rejected any implication that Ordnance
and Chesterfieldwere controlling authority on the applicability of the common law

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 375-76 (citations omitted).
547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. CI. 1976), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
Pitcairn,547 F.2d at 1124-25.
Id. at 1125-26.
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exemption to patent infringement liability, finding the relevant portions of the
court's opinions in those cases to be inapposite or dictum. 65 As a foreshadowing of
the Federal Circuit's reasoning some 20 years later, the Court of Claims appeared
to depart from the standards of intent to infringe in Whittemore and de minimis
harm in Byam, in favor of the touchstone inquiry of whether the otherwise
infringing activity was consistent with the legitimate business of the accused
infringer. Aside from foreclosing the considerations of intent or impact, the
adoption of such a threshold seemingly rendered the common law exemption to
patent infringement liability inapplicable except perhaps to hobbyist undertakings.
The Federal Circuit has not departed from the strict construction of the
common law exemption to patent infringement liability observed by the Court of
Claims in Pitcairn. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,66 the
Federal Circuit rejected the application of the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability to the specific context of the clinical testing of the generic
version of a patented pharmaceutical for FDA approval purposes. The Federal
Circuit's holding in Roche precipitated the legislative response of enacting the
67
statutory experimental use exemption as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
In refusing to apply the common law exemption to patent infringement
liability to Bolar's activities, the Federal Circuit declined to abolish the exemption
per se, but held that it did not apply in this particular case. According to the
Federal Circuit, the clear pre-commercial nature of Bolar's experimentation
rendered inapposite the application of the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability. The Federal Circuit stated:
The so-called experimental use defense to liability for infringement generally
is recognized as originating in an opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Story
while on circuit in Massachusetts [in which] Justice Story sought to justify a trial
judge's instruction to a jury that an infringer must have an intent to use a patented
invention for profit, stating:
[I]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects.
Despite skepticism, Justice Story's seminal statement evolved until, by
1861, the law was 'well-settled that an experiment with a patented
article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or
curiosity, or for mere amusement is not an infringement of the rights of

65. Id. at 1125.
66. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984), supersededon other grounds
by35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1984).
67. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text (discussing Hatch-Waxman Amendments and
ANDA infringement).
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the patentee.' Professor Robinson firmly entrenched the experimental
use exception into the patent law when he wrote his famous treatise ....
The Court of Claims, whose precedents bind us, on several occasions
has considered the defense of experimental use. Bolar concedes, as it
must, that its intended use of flurazepam HCI does not fall within the
'traditional limits' of the experimental use exception as established in
these cases or those of other circuits. Its concession here is fatal.
Despite Bolar's argument that its tests are 'true scientific inquiries" to
which a literal interpretation of the experimental use exception logically
should extend, we hold the experimental use exception to be truly
narrow, and we will not expand it under the present circumstances.
Bolar's argument that the experimental use rule deserves a broad
construction is not justified.
Bolar's intended 'experimental' use is solely for business reasons and
not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry. Bolar's intended use of flurazepam HCI to derive FDA required
test data is thus an infringement of the '053 patent. Bolar may intend to
perform 'experiments,' but unlicensed experiments conducted with a
view to the adaption of the patented invention to the experimentor's
business is a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others
from using his patented invention. It is obvious here that it is a
misnomer to call the intended use de minimis. It is no trifle in its
economic effect on the parties even if the quantity used is small. It is no
dilettante affair such as Justice Story envisioned. We cannot construe
the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent
laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite,
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.68
Following Pitcairnand Roche, seemingly few, if any, unauthorized activities
involving a patented invention would not violate § 271(a) under the broad
definition of an infringing use, given the narrow, and arguably waning, view of a
common law exemption to patent infringement liability, whether applied to
research or experimental use or otherwise.
Nearly two decades later in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,69 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the SEC's motion for
judgment as a matter of law. The district court rejected the SEC's contention that
certain tests performed did not infringe because they were scientific experiments
and did not result in the sale of any machines, and therefore were either merely de
minimis or exempt under common law defense to patent infringement liability. In
his concurring opinion, Judge Rader stated:

68. Roche Products,Inc., 733 F.2d at 862-63 (citations omitted).
69. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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[T]he Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use
excuses for infringement. Because the Patent Act confers the right to
preclude 'use,' not 'substantial use,' no room remains in the law for a de
minimis excuse. Similarly, because intent is irrelevant to patent
infringement, an experimental use excuse cannot survive.
When
infringement is proven either minimal or wholly non-commercial, the
damage computation process provides full flexibility for courts to
preclude large (or perhaps any) awards for minimal infringements.
This court affirms the district court's denial of SEC's de minimis and
experimental use excuses, but I read the Patent Act to preclude these
excuses altogether. SEC essentially asserts an affirmative defense,
combining a plea based on the amount or quantum of infringing activity
(de minimis) with a plea based on the character or intent of the
infringing activity (experimental use). Although courts have
occasionally addressed these separate excuses as if they were one,
clarity calls for separate analyses.
Since its inception, this court has not tolerated the notion that a little
infringement--de minimis infringement-is acceptable infringement or
not infringement at all. The statute states directly that any unauthorized
use of a patented invention is an infringement. Thus, the statute leaves
no leeway to excuse infringement because the infringer only infringed a
little. Rather, the statute accommodates concerns about de minimis
infringement in damages calculations. Although not influencing the
finding of infringement itself, the amount, quantum, or economic effect
of wrongful conduct is central to the damages assessment. For these
reasons, this court might better have declined SEC's invitation to
engage in an inherently subjective determination of how little
infringement is necessary to escape infringement liability. The Patent
Act simply authorizes no such conjecture.
Turning next to the experimental use excuse, neither the statute nor
any past Supreme Court precedent gives any reason to excuse
infringement because it was committed with a particular purpose or
intent, such as for scientific experimentation or idle curiosity. Rather,
the Supreme Court and this court have recently reiterated that intent is
irrelevant to infringement.
These recent pronouncements should
dispose of the intent-based prong of SEC's argument.
Before Warner-Jenkinson, this court addressed arguments based on
the character or intent of infringement .... The Supreme Court's recent
reiteration that infringement does not depend on the intent underlying
the allegedly infringing conduct, to my eyes, precludes any further
experimental use defense, even in the extraordinarily narrow form
recognized in Roche. Of course, even if the experimental use excuse
retains some lingering vitality, the slightest commercial implication will
render the 'philosophical
inquiry/experimental use'
doctrine
inapplicable, as occurs in the court's resolution today. Therefore, I
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concur completely in the court's resolution of this case, although I
would lay to rest permanently SEC's infringement excuses which find
no support in the Patent Act.7 °
71
Indeed, this notion was recently reaffirmed in Madey v. Duke University,
where the Federal Circuit, inter alia, reversed and remanded the district court's
summary judgment that Duke did not infringe U.S. Patents No. 4,641,103 and No.
5,130,994, which related to free electron lasers, because the experimental use
defense applied to Duke's use of patented laser technology owned by Dr. John M.
J. Madey.72
Duke had recruited Madey and his free electron laser (FEL) research lab from
Stanford University in 1989. 73 Duke constructed a building addition to its physics
facility to accommodate the FEL lab and its substantial equipment.74 Madey
served for almost a decade as director of the FEL lab at Duke, during which time
the lab achieved continued success in both research funding and scientific
breakthroughs. 75 Eventually, however, a conflict arose between Madey and
Duke.76 The university charged Madey with the ineffective management of the
FEL lab, while Madey asserted that Duke attempted to use the lab's equipment for
unauthorized research." Duke removed Madey as director of the lab in 1997, and
Madey resigned from Duke in 1998.78 When Duke continued to operate some of
the equipment in the lab, Madey sued Duke for patent infringement.79
The district court granted summary judgment to Duke, dismissing Madey's
patent infringement claim based upon the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability. 80 Specifically, the district court found that Duke's use of the
FEL lab equipment was "solely for research, academic or experimental
purposes.,,8 The Federal Circuit stated:
Our precedent, to which we are bound, continues to recognize the
judicially created experimental use defense, however, in a very limited
form. [E]xperimental use is [not] an affirmative defense...
[T]he district court had an overly broad conception of the very narrow
and strictly limited experimental use defense. The district court stated
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71.
72.
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74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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Id. at. 216 F.3d at 1352-53 (Rader, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1352.
Id.
Id.
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
Id.
Id.
at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1355-57.
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361.
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that the experimental use defense inoculated uses that 'were solely for
research, academic, or experimental purposes,' and that the defense
covered use that 'is made for experimental, non-profit purposes only'....
[T]he defense [is] very narrow and limited to actions performed 'for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry.' Further, use does not qualify for the experimental use defense
when it is undertaken in the 'guise of scientific inquiry' but has
'definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes'....
[U]se is disqualified from the defense if it has the 'slightest commercial
implication.' Moreover, use in keeping with the legitimate business of
the alleged infringer does not qualify for the experimental use
defense....
Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is in any way
commercial in nature. Similarly, our precedent does not immunize any
conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate
business, regardless of commercial implications... [M]ajor research
universities, such as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects
with arguably no commercial application whatsoever. However, these
projects unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty
participating in these projects. These projects also serve, for example, to
increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research grants,
students and faculty.
In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and
strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or nonprofit status of the user is not determinative.
In the present case, the district court attached too great a weight to the
non-profit, educational status of Duke, effectively suppressing the fact
that Duke's acts appear to be in accordance with any reasonable
interpretation of Duke's legitimate business objectives. On remand, the
district court will have to significantly narrow and limit its conception
of the experimental use defense. The correct focus should not be on the
non-profit status of Duke but on the legitimate business Duke is
involved in and whether or not the use was solely for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.82
The Federal Circuit has yet to abolish the common law exemption to patent
infringement liability. However, its decision in Madey leaves grave doubt that the
common law exemption to patent infringement liability can act as a safe harbor for

82. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361-63 (citations omitted).
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any academic research effort. The relevant factors for such a determination
arguably discount the nature of the defendant (whether academic, non-profit or
not-for-profit in status) as well as the intent behind the conduct (non-pecuniary or
non-commercial), as long as the act somehow can be related to a legitimate
business purpose. Moreover, even where the experimental work can be shown to
occur outside the umbrella of a research institution or other enterprise, the
protection of the common law exemption to patent infringement liability likely will
not extend to activity other than hobbyist tinkering or testing of a patented
invention for verification and reproducibility. As a practical matter, it is difficult
to imagine the first type of activity garnering the attention of a patentee's policing
program. With respect to the second type of activity, the doctrines of first sale
(patent exhaustion) or permissible repair might be implicated to shield such
conduct.
II
In the absence of a safe harbor for academic research in the common law
exemption to patent infringement liability, the advocacy for a bona fide research
use exemption has taken on a renewed vigor. 83 The concerns regarding the public
policy and procedural complications that an infringement liability loophole such as
a bona fide research use exemption would create are matched against concerns,
which have support at least anecdotally, that apprehension over patent rights chills
innovation and inhibits progress in the academic research community.
Furthermore, some have criticized the lack of a bonafide research use exemption
84
in the United States as contrary to accepted international standards.
At first blush, it would appear that many countries recognize an experimental
use exemption to patent 4infringement liability. However, upon more careful
examination, it becomes clear that such provisions pertain only to the same two
aspects of experimental use condoned under U.S. law in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and
what remains of the common law exemption to patent infringement liability after
Madey.5 Despite seemingly broad language, the actual operation of the various
foreign laws reveals their specific applications to data collection for regulatory
approval and the operability of a patented invention.
Various foreign laws expressly provide for a general research use exemption
to patent infringement liability:

83. See supra note 3, at 2 (representing the views in favor of a recognized research use exemption
of over twenty-five academic institutions and four organizations whose memberships comprise of U.S.
universities and colleges).
84. See Lauren C. Bruzzone, The Research Exemption. A Proposal,21 AM. INTELL. PROP. ASS'N
Q.J. 1, 52 (1993); Stephen B. Maebius and Harold C. Wegner, Ruling on Research Exemption Roils
Universities, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at C3.
85. See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing Madey in detail).
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European Patent Convention
[R]ights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts done for
86
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention.
German Law
The effects of the patent shall not extend to ... acts done for experimental
purposes which are related to the subject matter of the patented invention .... 87
British Law
An act which . . . would constitute an infringement of a patent for an
invention shall not do so if - (a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not
commercial; (b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter
of the invention ....

86. Community Patent Convention Art. 27(b) (1989).
87. German Patent Act § 11, No. 2 (1994). See also German Federal Supreme Court (BGH),
GRUR (1996), 109 ("Klinische Versuche I"), available at 1997 WL 1104814; German Federal
Supreme Court (BGH), Mitt. (1997), 253 ("Klinische Versuche II") (clinical tests It), in Hans-Rainer
Jaenichen and Friederike Stolzenburg, Patent Infringement by ClinicalTrials in EPC Contracting
States?, *1, § 1.3, available at http://www.vossiusandpartner.com/eng/publication/pub-epc.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2003):
Since Sec. 11 No. 2 of the Patent Act restricts the experimental acts neither qualitatively nor
quantitatively this means that studies and trials may represent purely scientific experiments or
commercially-oriented tests. According to the wording of the provision it is not relevant whether the
tests yield scientifically or commercially useful results or whether a protected active ingredient is tested
with the aim of obtaining data for an application for approval as a drug, thereby preparing the launching
of the drug after expiration of the patent term. The only requirement is that the tests are intended to
yield knowledge on the subject matter including its use that are intended to remove an existing
uncertainty. This may also be the case, if- like in the present case - a pharmaceutical composition
containing the protected active ingredient shall be tested in clinical tests for its effectiveness and
tolerability. It is not evident from the wording of the provision that it would exclude an economical
orientation or commercial objective of the experimental acts.
88. United Kingdom Patents Act 1977, Art. 60 § 5 (1985). See also Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 1985 R.P.C. 515, 542 (Eng. C.A.):
Trials carried out in order to discover something unknown or to test a hypothesis or even in order to
find out whether something which is known to work in specific conditions, e.g., of soil or weather, will
work in different conditions can fairly, in my judgment, be regarded as experiments. But trials carried
out in order to demonstrate to a third party that a product works or, in order to amass information to
satisfy a third party . . . that the product works as its maker claims are not, in my judgment, to be
regarded as acts done 'for experimental purposes.' The purposes for which tests or trials are carried out
may in some cases be mixed and may in some cases be difficult to discern; indeed, in the present case,
if fuller evidence is given at the trial, a different result may then be reached.
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JapaneseLaw

[T]he effects of the patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent
right for the purposes of experiment or research.89
Chinese Law

None of the following shall be deemed an infringement of the patent right:
..where any person uses the patent concerned solely for the purpose of scientific
90
research and experiment.
However, the operation of these laws belies their applicability to instances of
otherwise infringing acts other than those involving experimental use akin to the
activities exempt in the United States under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), or those relating
91
to testing a patented invention for verification and reproducibility purposes.
III

A bona fide research use exemption to patent infringement liability in the
specific context of genetic research has been the subject of recent legislative
action. Former U.S. Representative Lynn Rivers (D-Michigan) introduced a bill
on March 14, 2002, seeking, inter alia, to exempt genetic research from patent
infringement liability. The text of H.R. 396792 reads in pertinent part:
SEC. 2. EXEMPTION FROM INFRINGEMENT FOR RESEARCH
ON GENETIC SEQUENCE INFORMATION.
Section 271 of title 35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
"(j) USE OF GENETIC SEQUENCE INFORMATION.-

89. Japanese Patent Law § 69(1) (1991). See also H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and
PatentProtectionin Japan: A Half-Centuryof Progress,A New Millennium of Challenges, 16 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 71, 118 (2002) ("Until recently, Japanese court decisions diverged from U.S. law that
permits experimental use (typically clinical studies) of patented pharmaceuticals by non-licensees
aimed at expediting introduction of generic versions of those drugs.") (footnote omitted); John A.
Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune-PharmaceuticalExperimentalUse and PatentInfringement in Japan,
4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 34 (1998) ("The broader issue of non-regulatory experimental use is not
exempted by Article 69(1) and any non-health regulatory commercial-related experimental use will
most probably still infringe the patent right since this sort of experimental use will not be in furtherance
of the goals of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law.").
90. Chinese Patent Law 5, Art. 62 (1984).
91. See Parker, supra note 7, at 648-57 (reviewing the laws of the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Germany regarding experimental or research use); see generally Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Fiederike
Stolzenburg, supra note 87 (reviewing the relevant laws of Germany, the United Kingdom, France,
Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Portugal, Belgium and Cyprus).
92. H.R. REP. No. 107-3967 (2002).
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(1) It shall not be an act of infringement for any individual or entity to
use any patent for or patented use of genetic sequence information for
purposes of research. This paragraph shall not apply to any individual or
entity that is directly engaged in the commercial manufacture,
commercial sale, or commercial offer for sale of a drug, medical device,
process, or other product using such patent for or patented use of genetic
sequence information.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection"(E) the term 'research' means a systematic investigation, including
research development, testing, and evaluation,
designed to develop or
93
contribute to generalizable knowledge.".
No further congressional action has been taken regarding H.R. 3967. In any
event, the proposed legislation helps to crystallize the problematic nature of
appropriately defining the boundaries of a bona fide research use exemption to
patent infringement liability.
In particular, the limitation to generalizable
knowledge purpose would seem an illusive standard to apply reliably and
consistently.
The absence of a statutory research use exemption does not necessarily leave
the academic science community without recourse. For example, federal and state
government scientists, including those at federal or state academic institutions,
arguably are shielded from patent infringement liability by virtue of statutory or
constitutional provisions of sovereign immunity. The federal government may
appropriate patented technology without authorization. The remedy for such use
lies with an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1498,94 which allows a prevailing patentee to
recover reasonable compensation for the unauthorized use. Similarly, the state
government may rely upon the Eleventh Amendment as a shield against patent
infringement liability. 95 The remedy for such state action may lie with individual
state laws regarding eminent domain proceedings. Furthermore, although the
patent law does not provide for a compulsory license scheme, under in special
circumstances, the public interest in access to certain patented subject matter might
warrant the district court's denial of a grant of injunctive relief to prevent the use
of the technology. The result of such a denial is effectively a compulsory license
by which the infringer would owe a reasonable royalty for the infringing use.

93. Id.§ 2 0)(2).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1998).
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. X1 ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); see also, e.g., Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding unconstitutional the
Patent Remedy Act provision that abrogated state immunity from patent infringement suits).
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In each of the situations described above, a balance is struck between the
necessity of public access to patented technology for research purposes and the
support of beneficial exclusivity in fostering investment in the commercial
development of such research. At least the chilling effects on innovation and
progress can be alleviated with the knowledge that research use of a patented
invention may not be prohibited, and that a reasonable compensation to the
patentee for such use will be set in retrospect in a climate where the concepts of
culpability and willful infringement supporting enhanced or otherwise punitive
damages might have less applicability.
CONCLUSIONS

The importance to innovation of striking an appropriate balance between
unfettered access to patented technology and commercial exclusivity cannot be
overstated. Whether or not evidenced by empirical data available today, the notion
that the chilling effect of patent rights takes some toll on scientific research
endeavors appears to have at least anecdotal support. However, an outright
exemption to patent infringement liability for research use, without clear
definitional guidelines, would undermine the confidence in the legal rights as well
as present investment backed expectations.

